Abstract. The RC4 stream cipher is the most widely used software based stream cipher. It is based on a secret internal state of N = 256 bytes and two pointers. This paper proposes an efficient algorithm to compute a special set of RC4 states named non-fortuitous predictive states. These special states increase the probability to guess part of the internal state in a known plaintext attack and present a cryptanalytic weakness of RC4. The problem of designing a practical algorithm to compute them has been open since it was posed by Mantin and Shamir in 2001. We also formally prove a slightly corrected version of the conjecture by Mantin and Shamir of 2001 that, using only a known elements along with the two pointers at some round, the RC4 pseudorandom generation algorithm cannot produce more than a outputs in the next N rounds.
Introduction
RC4 is the most widely used software based stream cipher. The cipher has been integrated into SSL and WEP implementations. RC4 is extremely fast and its design is simple. The cipher was designed by Ron Rivest in 1987 and kept as a trade secret until it was leaked out in 1994.
In this paper we formally prove the conjecture (due to Mantin and Shamir [1] ) that only a known elements along with i and j at any RC4 round cannot predict more than a output bytes in the next N rounds. The set of non-fortuitous predictive states reduces the data and time complexity of the branch and bound attack on RC4 [1, 7] . So far there was no efficient algorithm to obtain those states. The main achievement of this paper is that we design a practical two-phase recursive algorithm to determine the non-fortuitous predictive states. The complexity is far less than the trivial exhaustive search for small values of a.
Description of RC4
RC4 runs in two phases (description in Fig. 1 ). The first part is the key scheduling algorithm KSA which takes an array S to derive a permutation of {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1} using a variable size key K. The second part is the output generation part PRGA which produces pseudo-random bytes using the permutation derived from KSA. Each iteration or 'round' produces one output value. Plaintext bytes are bit-wise XOred with the output bytes to produce ciphertext. In most of the applications RC4 is used with word length n = 8 bits and N = 256. The symbol l denotes the byte-length of the secret key. 
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Previous Attacks on RC4
RC4 came under intensive scrutiny after it has been made public in 1994. Finney showed in [3] a class of states that RC4 will never enter. The class contains all the states for which j = i + 1 and S[j] = 1. A fraction of approximately N −2 of all possible states fall under Finney's forbidden states. It is simple to show that these states are connected by a cycle of length N (N − 1). We know that RC4 states are also connected in a cycle and the initial state, where i = 0 and j = 0, is not one of the Finney's forbidden states. Finney's forbidden states play a significant role in the analysis of non-fortuitous predictive states.
Jenkins detected in [5] a probabilistic correlation between the secret information (S, j) and the public information (i, output). Golić in [6] showed a positive correlation between the second binary derivative of the least significant bit output sequence and 1. Fluhrer and McGrew in [2] observed stronger correlations between consecutive bytes. Properties of the state transition graph of RC4 were analyzed by Mister and Tavares [9] . Grosul and Wallach demonstrated a related key attack that works better on very long keys. Andrew Roos also discovered in [10] classes of weak keys. Knudsen et al. have attacked versions of RC4 with n < 8 by their backtracking algorithm in which the adversary guesses the internal state and checks if an anomaly occurs in later stage [7] . In the case of contradiction the algorithm backtracks through the internal states and re-guesses.
The most serious weakness in RC4 was observed by Mantin and Shamir in [1] where they found that the probability of occurrence of zero at the second round is twice as large as expected. In broadcast applications a practical ciphertext only attack can exploit this weakness.
Fluhrer et al. in [11] have recently shown that if some portion of the secret key is known then RC4 can be broken completely. This is of practical importance because in the Wired Equivalence Privacy Protocol (WEP in short) a fixed secret key is concatenated with IV modifiers to encrypt different messages. In [12] it is shown that the attack is feasible.
Mironov, in [4] , modelled RC4 as a Markov chain and recommended to dump the initial 12×N bytes of the output stream (at least 3×N ) in order to obtain uniform distribution of the initial permutation of elements. A b-predictive a-state necessarily means that the execution of RC4 does not stop before b known outputs are produced. The RC4 execution only stops when i or j is not available at some round, that is, when the internal state can not be updated deterministically at some round. In the definition, the first assertion is that an a-state is the snapshot of the RC4 state immediately before the first predicted output (a elements of the SBox that do not produce any output are of no importance in the present context). Secondly, we set the upper bound on r b to N instead of 2N as mentioned in [1] . We apologize that the term "non-fortuitous" is a misnomer. The term was coined to contrast it with the fortuitous states defined in [2] . In fact, "non-fortuitous" predictive states are fortuitous too and are far more complex to derive. As the term non-fortuitous predictive state is too long, in the rest of the paper we will use non-fortuitous state synonymously with it.
Non-fortuitous Predictive RC4 States

Definitions of
Importance of Predictive States
As mentioned in [1] , the existence of b-predictive a-states is important for the cryptanalyst as a elements of the S-Box including j (note that the i value is always available to the cryptanalyst) can be extracted with non-trivial probability by observing b specific output bytes in the output segment.
Let the events E A and E B denote the occurrences of an a-state and the corresponding b outputs when the i value of an a-state is known. We assume uniformity of the internal state and the corresponding external state for any fixed i value of the internal state. Assuming a much smaller than N and disregarding the small bias induced in E B due to E A , we apply Bayes' Rule to get, (1)).
To determine the maximum value of b for a given a, we first formally prove the very important theorem that if a b-predictive a-state exists then a ≥ b. This was left as a conjecture in [1] . 1 So, the best attack along this line is to obtain all the a-predictive a-states, keep the information a priori in a database indexed by the values of the i pointer (sorted by outputs) and look up the output sequence for a possible match.
Throughout the paper S r [l] denotes the element of the S-Box indexed by l at the r th round (whether S r [l] is before or after the swapping at the r th round, should be understood in the context); the first predicted output corresponds to round 1. Similarly, i t and j t denote the values of i and j respectively at round t. Proof. The theorem is trivially true when a = N as, according to definition, outputs are predicted in the next N rounds only. Therefore, if a = N elements of the S-box are known they will produce b = N elements in the next N rounds. Below we consider the case when a < N . Let us assume that an a-state produces b outputs and b > a. As shown in Fig. 2 , all the b outputs are generated, as the i pointer sweeps through all the positions from the index k +1 till the index k +c, in c rounds (b ≤ c ≤ N ). The first and the last outputs are produced at the (k + 1) th and (k + c) th rounds respectively. In each of the c rounds i, j should be available otherwise RC4 halts forever (see PRGA in Fig. 1 ) because the swapping operation cannot be executed deterministically.
Lemma 1. Starting from any a-state (i.e., at round 0) no unknown element of the S-box becomes known in the subsequent rounds of the execution of the pseudorandom generation algorithm of RC4 . Proof (Lemma). Let
the set of elements arranged in some order in the S-box where the U i 's are unknown elements and the K j 's are known elements at round 0. Note that the subscripts associated with the elements (for example, i of U i ) do not indicate their indices in the S-box. Observe that, with the execution of RC4 pseudorandom bit generator, only the positions (i.e., the indices) of the elements change. Suppose an unknown element (say U l ) at round 0 becomes known at some RC4 round t where t ≥ 1. This fact implies that there must be an operation to assign a value to U l during the execution. But the only transformation the RC4 pseudorandom generation algorithm performs is the transposition of elements of the S-box (see Fig. 1 ). Thus, we reach a contradiction, which proves the lemma.
Availability of j at each of these rounds implies that S[i] is also available because the previous value of j is known (note, is unknown) at most one new-cell 3 will be filled with a known element. So, a maximum of (c − b) different new-cells between k + 1 and k + c will be filled with known elements at least once in the aforementioned c rounds. Consequently, a minimum of b different indices in the S-Box between k+1 and k + c must be occupied with as many known elements at round 0, otherwise we reach a scenario where we have at least one new-cell which is never filled with a known elements in c rounds. This is impossible as S[i] is known in each of the c rounds as a necessary condition. As we have only a known elements where a < b, we reach a contradiction. Therefore, our assumption (i.e., a < b) is wrong. We conclude that b ≤ a, i.e., an a-state can not predict more than a outputs in the next N rounds.
We have already defined an a-state as the partially specified state of RC4 (i.e., a elements of S-Box, i and j) just before the 1 st output is predicted.
We emphasize that a elements of the S-Box that predict b outputs may change its positions as RC4 runs. So taking the snapshot of the a elements of the S-Box immediately before the round of the 1 st predicted output is cryptanalytically equivalent to those a elements at some other rounds. Proof. The proof is immediate from Theorem 1.
Necessary and Sufficient Condition for a Predictive State to be Non-fortuitous
Quite understandably, the larger the number of a-predictive a-states, the larger will be the probability to obtain one of them under the reasonable assumption of uniformity of RC4 states. Fortuitous states can be easily obtained using the state counting algorithm described in [2] . Our objective is to develop a method to determine non-fortuitous states of any length. The following theorem and the corollary divide a-predictive a-states into fortuitous states and non-fortuitous states. Proof. The only if part of the theorem is direct from the definition of a fortuitous state. Now we prove the if part.
We prove it by contradiction. Let us assume that there exists at least one a-predictive a-state for which the outputs are consecutive but the elements of the S-Box are not consecutive. We assume that the generation of outputs starts when i points to S 1 [k +1] (see Fig. 2 ) and the a th output is issued when i points to S a [k +a]. During the passage of i from the index (k + 1) to the index (k + a), the number of outputs generated is also a. So, each of the a rounds produces output. Let us assume that there is at least one empty cell, say S 0 [k + t], between the indices k + 1 and k + a at round 0. At the t th round, S t [k + t] should contain a known value otherwise j cannot be updated at this round and consequently no output can be predicted. As S 0 [k + t] was initially empty, there is a round, say the r th round where r < t, when one known value will be swapped into the empty S r [k + t] for the first time (note there may be many such rounds). As a consequence, the r th round does not produce output because swapping takes place when j points to S r [k + t] which is unknown at that time. But we assumed that each of the a rounds produces output. Eventually we reach a contradiction. Therefore, our assumption, i.e., the S-Box elements are not consecutive, is wrong.
As things stand, we have a consecutive elements that are fixed in the S-Box and we get a outputs in the next a rounds. This is just the case of a fortuitous state of length a.
Corollary 2. An a-predictive a-state is a non-fortuitous state of length a if and only if the predicted output words are not consecutive.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Theorem 2.
Structure of Non-fortuitous States
The most interesting question that remains is whether such states really exist. Is it possible to get non-fortuitous states of any length a?
The two examples given by Mantin and Shamir in [1] Proof. Any 1-predictive 1-state is of the form i 0 = 2x − 1, j 0 = x and S 0 [2x] = x. This is clearly a fortuitous state of length 1 (x is an integer chosen from 0 to N − 1).
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The above theorem implies that the number of 1-predictive 1-states is N and there is no non-fortuitous state of length 1. Determination of non-fortuitous states of length a, where a > 1, has inherent difficulties on two counts. Firstly, the relative positions of the SBox elements at the beginning are not known. Secondly, the set of indices containing known elements of the S-Box changes as RC4 runs. The most straightforward and naive method would be to select all possible a indices, assign to the elements pointed to by those indices and j all possible values and finally select those states which generate a non-consecutive outputs (by Corollary 2, non-consecutiveness of outputs is a necessary and sufficient condition for an a-predictive a-state to be non-fortuitous). But the cost of computation, which is O(N 2a+1 ) for a N , makes such method too costly when N = 256 and a = 2 and completely impractical when a > 2. At this point Finney's forbidden state (see [3] ) comes to our rescue. 5 Fig. 2 Proof. Let us assume that there is at least one 2-predictive 2-state which is non-fortuitous. Now we try to predict two elements (that must not be consecutive) from this state. From Proposition 1, S 0 [p 1 ] and S 0 [p 2 ] should contain known elements (see Fig. 4 ). At round 1 we will have the same positions occupied with known values as round 0 because no new-cell will get any value as output is produced at round 1. Output cannot be produced at round 2 otherwise we will have two consecutive outputs and clearly that will be a case of a fortuitous state by Theorem 2. Therefore, at round 2, i points to S 2 [p 2 ] and j should point to S 2 [p 3 ] as shown in Fig. 4(c) . For the j value to be available at round 3,
Proposition 1. The first two elements of the S-Box of any a-predictive a-state always occupy consecutive places if a ≥ 2, i.e., S 0 [k + 1] and
gives rise to Finney's forbidden state [3] , hence it is not possible. The S-Box arrangement at round 2 is shown in Fig. 4(c) . So, at round 3, we can not get any output because swapping takes place when j points to an empty cell S 3 [p 5 ] (see Fig. 4(d) ). After that, i points to S 4 [p 4 ] which is still empty. As a consequence, j 4 cannot be determined and the execution of RC4 halts. Therefore, we can not get any non-fortuitous state of length 2. Thus the theorem is proved.
Although we are unable to discover any non-fortuitous states so far but with the above results we are confident enough that no such state exists of length 1 or 2.
Determination of Non-fortuitous States: A General Approach
As mentioned before, two important factors make the determination of non-fortuitous states all the more difficult. Firstly, the relative positions of the a elements at round 0 are not known and secondly, in the subsequent rounds the indices containing the known elements change. Our algorithm is a two-phase one. The first part determines the possible relative positions of the a elements at round 0. The second part is a state counting algorithm that determines the individual non-fortuitous states.
Note, that for a fortuitous state the elements are always consecutive and the set of their indices does not change in the later rounds. Let d t denote the inter-element gap between the t th element and the (t + 1) th element. We measure d t = p t+1 − p t − 1 where the t th element is indexed by p t . 6 Let T a denote one such sequence (d 1 , d 2 , d 3 , ..., d a−1 ) . Note, that the total number of such sequences is
. So our first step is to sort out the sequences from the exhaustive set; more precisely, we try to reduce the search space. , d 2 , d 3 , ..., d t−1 ) that represent the possible inter-element gaps of the non-fortuitous states of length 6 The 1 st element is S0[i0 + 1]. All known elements in the direction of the movement of i are numbered accordingly. 7 The trivial maximum value of dt = N − (
Each sequence in L a=t generates a subset and the union of them results in L a=t+1 . Using Propositions 2 and 3 in Appendix A.1, it can be shown that no sequence of length (t − 1) outside L a=t can be a prefix of a sequence in L a=t+1 . Now, we outline how d max t can be evaluated. In fact, we will calculate the maximum value of the index of the (t + 1) th element, say
does not depend on the values of the indices of the SBox elements, we fix p 1 = 0 to ease the computation. We know that
The algorithm is a function Mainfunc which takes a sequence (0, d 2 , d 3 Proof. A proof is by induction on the length of non-fortuitous states.
To determine the individual non-fortuitous states of length a = t + 1 by a state counting recursive algorithm (the algorithm works in a similar 9 Note, by definition pt > 0. manner as the one described before) we take members from L a=t+1 one by one, vary p 1 from 0 to N − 1 and simulate RC4 without directly assigning values to the elements. In this case, at the first round, S[j] should be one of the known elements. The value of j max at each of the other rounds is also determined from the lists L 2 , L 3 ,.., L t . The range of the values of j (other than the first round) is all the indices between i + 1 and j max plus the indices containing known values between p 1 and i. That is how the search space is reduced. In this state counting algorithm, using Propositions 3 and 4 in Appendix A.1 it can be shown that if S[j] is known at some round then output has to be produced in that round, i.e.,
S[S[i]+S[j]]
should be a known element as well. This condition effectively reduces the search space again. The algorithm stops whenever a outputs are produced or S[i] is unknown. Among all the states, so obtained, we take only those with non-consecutive outputs.
We computed that the number of non-fortuitous states of length 3 and 4 are 7 and 1727 for N = 256. In Appendix A.4 we list all the non-fortuitous states of length 3. It is possible that many members in L a may not eventually produce any non-fortuitous states. But the relative positions of the elements of any non-fortuitous state of length a must correspond to an entry in L a . Our attempt is directed to develop a technique to eliminate all the trivial a-states which are impossible to predict a elements.
Cryptanalytic Significance of Non-fortuitous States
Although we mostly dealt with non-fortuitous predictive states, one can see that the algorithm is more robust, that is, it can as well be used to determine the set of b-predictive a-states for any a and b.
The average number of outputs, needed for any a-predictive a-state to occur, is reduced by knowing the number of non-fortuitous states of length a, in addition to that of the fortuitous states of length a [1] . Denote the number of fortuitous states and non-fortuitous states of length a by the symbol A and B. Assuming uniformity of the external states and the internal states, a specific elements occur as outputs at specific rounds with probability N −(a+1) . The knowledge of non-fortuitous states reduces the length of the output segment required for any a-predictive a-states to happen by N.N a+1 ( If we use the branch and bound attack [7] on RC4 n=8 with a priori information about 3 elements in the S-Box the attack is not much im-proved (an improvement of 2.36% on the number of required output bytes) as we have only 7 non-fortuitous states compared to 290 fortuitous states of the length 3. If we use a priori information about 4 elements, then with the complete information about non-fortuitous states, we require approximately 2 34.98 output bytes (which is around 21% less than the earlier estimate of 2 35.2 bytes based on only fortuitous states) for any 4-predictive 4-state to happen. Note, that the number of fortuitous states and non-fortuitous states of length 4 are 6540 and 1727 respectively.
Directions for Future Work and Conclusions
Our current work leaves room for more research. We proved Corollary 1 with a bound on the number of rounds. For small values of a, we observe that the j value is lost much earlier than the N th round. So, in such cases, Corollary 1 is true even without any bound on the number of rounds. A more challenging combinatorial problem, therefore, is what is the maximum value of a for which Corollary 1 is true without any bound on the number of rounds. From the point of view of cryptanalysis, although we are interested in small values of a (because a small increase in a drastically increases the required outputs for any attack), the problem seems alluring.
Another way to improve the present work is to suggest some elegant algebraic means to determine . We see that the set L a contains redundant members which increase the time and space complexity. We are convinced that the algorithm can be further improved.
Our work in this paper is a purely combinatorial analysis of RC4. We developed a practical scheme to derive a special set of RC4 states known as non-fortuitous predictive states. Apart from that many interesting properties of this cipher (e.g. known a elements cannot predict more than a elements in the next N rounds) are established. We hope these observations will lead to better understanding of the cipher. 
